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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
REGULATION, DIVISION OF
PUBLIC UTILITIES,
Petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH; MILLY 0. BERNARD,
Chairman; OLOF E. ZUNDEL,
Commissioner; and KENNETH
RIGTRUP, Commissioner,

Appeal No. 16241

Respondents,
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
IntervenorRespondents.
REPLY BRIEF ON REHEARING OF
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY TO BRIEF
IN OPPOSITION OF DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

Mountain Fuel Supply Company (hereinafter Mountain Fuel)
herewith files its Reply Brief incident to Rehearing, to the
Brief in Opposition of the Division of Public Utilities (hereinafter sometimes Division) under date of September 8, 1980.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In filing this Reply Brief, Mountain Fuel is aware that
a reply in a case on rehearing is not the usual practice.

But

the Sponsored
Briefby theinS.J. Opposition
to Rehearing of the Division of Public
Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Utilities in this matter is not in any sense usual.

It

contains testimonial remarks of Division counsel and new
material which have never been raised or urged by any party at
an earlier time.
Accordingly, this Reply Brief is mandated in order that
this Court may not be deceived or misled.

A reply is proper

under the attendant facts.
POINT I
THE ANSWERING BRIEF OF THE DIVISION IS
REPLETE WITH TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS OF
DIVISION COUNSEL.
The Division Brief in Opposition to the petitions for
rehea~ing

of Mountain Fuel and the Public Service Commission

is a remarkable if not novel document.

The Division counsel,

Mr. Randle, proffers his personal testimony and experience
throughout his Brief with respect to the practice and procedure
1/
before various federal and state regulatory commissions.This testimonial display is both improper and ironic
improper for a lawyer to become a witness in a brief and then
2/
argue his own credibility to the Court- --- ironic because
counsel's testimony is based upon his own personal observation
of the Utah Public Service Commission in his role as Commission
staff counsel.

!/

y

Pages 2, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 15 and 16 of the Division's Brief in
Opposition are examples of the extraordianry, gratuitous evidence
offered by Mr. Randle in this Case.
See Canons of Professional Responsibility of Utah State Bar DR S-102.
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Division counsel calls attention in footnotes l and 2 of
his Brief to the appearance of the Commission on Rehearing
and of the alleged impropriety of that appearance because of
purported "influence" exerted by Hountain Fuel.

As will be

noted hereafter, the appearance of the Commission is completely
proper at any phase in this Case, including Rehearing.

As to

the accusation of influence peddling, such is an attack upon
the integrity and independence of the Commission to act on
its own. It retained its own legal counsel and submitted its
own position to this Court on Rehearing.

Such was not altogether

surprising, for the Commission had been patently and wrongfully
abandoned by its own legal counsel who had opted to represent
3/
the Division staff on appeal rather than the Commission, itself.The conduct of the Commission on Rehearing was of its
undertaking and not of Mountain Fuel.

own

In light of the abandonment

by staff counsel and the attack by that counsel on the Commission
Order, it was neither improper nor surprising that the Commission
would discuss with Mountain Fuel the issues raised by the Opinion
of the Court under date of June 19, 1980.
The testimonial account and personal observation of the
Division counsel in its Brief are not only procedurally improper,
but are, in most respects, substantively inaccurate.

Counsel's

diatribe must be addressed in this Reply in order that this

The statute makes it mandatory for the Attorney General to attend
the Supreme Court of Utah in behalf of the Public Service Commission.
G7-5-l(l) U.C.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol. 7A)
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Honorable Court is not deceived or misled on the issues squarely
presented in the Mountain Fuel Petition for Rehearing.
POINT II
THE APPEARANCE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE

cor~ISSION

IS ENTIRELY PROPER AND AUTHORIZED ON AN APPEAL
AND REHEARING OF ITS ORDER.
The Division, at page 2 of its Brief in Opposition,
reaches the quite astonishing conclusion that the Commission's
appearance in this Case on rehearing is contrary to law.
After reciting the Commission statement in its Petition for
Rehearing that it does not normally enter every appeal from
its Orders, the Division Brief states that such Commission
expression is "fully consistent with the Supreme Court's
Opinion herein and is the law."
The Division position is patently wrong and wrong for the
wrong reason.

The Statute, 54-7-16 U.C.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol.

6A) under which an appeal to the Supreme Court is taken from a
Commission Order, expressly states that the Commission shall
have standing to appear and be heard before this Court:
"* * * The Commission and each party to the
action or proceeding before the Commission
shall have the right to appear in the review
proceedings."

The Commission's statement on page 2 of its rehearing Brief
that it does not, itself, appear before the Supreme Court "under
normal circumstances" is no doubt due to the fact that its
staff counsel has, in the past, "normally appeared" on the
appeal of a Commission Order and defended and represented the
Sponsored by theposition.
S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Commission
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The Division counsel is quick to cite in his personal
testimony on page 14 of the Brief in Opposition the proceedings
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (formerly Federal
Power Commission or FPC and hereinafter "FERC").

It turns out

that FERC regularly appears in federal courts and takes an
active role, through its staff counsel, in appeals of FERC
decisions.

See for example, Federal Power Commission v.

Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 92 S.Ct. 1827, 32
L.Ed.2d 369, 375

(1972); Federal Power Commission v. Hope

Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 64 S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed. 333, 336
(1944); Blanco Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
598 F.2d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
It is not too much to suggest that if the Utah Commission
were to exercise its statutory right and appear in proceedings
before this Court with regard to an appeal of its own Order, this
Court would have a better foundation and base upon which to gauge
the regulatory policy and procedure of the Commission.

Such

would have been unquestionably of significant aid to this Court
on the main appeal in the Case at Bar.
POINT III.
CONTRARY TO THE DIVISION BRIEF, THE LITTLE
HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT DOES NOT EXPRESS
LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The Division Brief relies upon and quotes extensively from
the Report of the Commission on the organization of the Executive Branch of Government (January 15, 1966) in support of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Division claim that the Utah Legislature, in the 1969 reorganization of the Department of Business Regulation, intended to
transfer prosecutorial and investigatorial functions of the
Commission to the Division of Public Utilities.
Brief in Opposition, pp. 9-11.

See Division

The Division reliance is mis-

placed and its quotations flatly erroneous.
Contrary to the testimony of Mr. Randle and the Division
Brief, the Little Hoover Commission Report of 1966 was neither a
study nor the work of a legislative committee of this State and,
therefore, does not express any "legislative intent".

Rather,

the Report was only a recommendation of a citizen task force.
Much of it was rejected outright by the 1969 Legislature.

In

point of fact, several recommendations of the Little Hoover
Report called for the replacement of the Utah Public Service Commission with a "Public Service Division", the latter to be solely
an executive agency without power to hear and decide regulatory
4/
matters effecting public utilities.- The Little Hoover Report
further recommended that the Utah Commission, while temporarily
in existence during a phase-out period, possess no rule-making
5/
authority.- The stubborn fact is that the intent of the
Little Hoover Report was to replace the Utah Commission with an
executive agency and transfer its quasi-judicial jurisdiction
to the very type of administrative court which this Court's
Opinion of June 19, 1980 will create if that Opinion is not

y

Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government (1966), pp. 212, 214, 265.

2/

Ibid. at p. 257.
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reconsidered and modified in this Rehearing.
It is without contest that the 1969 Legislature, in the
enactment of the Reorganization Act of the Department of
Business Regulation, fundamentally disagreed with the major
policy recommendations of the Little Hoover Report as they
related to utility regulation. The proposed "Public Service
Division" was never created and the quasi-judicial and rulemaking authority of the Utah Commission was reaffirmed under
13-l-l.l and 13-l-1.3 U.C.A. 1953 (Repl. Vol. 2A).
The fact that the Legislature acted precisely opposite to
the Little Hoover recommendations is the strongest indication
that it had a contrary intent with regard to the continuing
viability of the Commission as an investigatory and prosecutorial body as well as a quasi-judicial and rule-making agency.
The testimony of Division counsel and the position of the
Division in its Brief in Opposition is patently flawed.
POINT IV
CONTRARY TO THE DIVISION BRIEF, OTHER
REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFFS DO NOT
APPEAL THEIR COMMISSIONS' ORDERS.
On page 14 of the Division Brief in Opposition, Mr. Randle
testifies with regard to his "broad familiarity" with the
regulatory practice and procedure of FERC.

The apparent purpose

of this testimony is to buttress the Division position herein
that, even though it is admittedly staff to the Utah Commission,
it has standing to appeal a Commission Order because of an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-7Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

otherwise resulting conflict between prosecutorial and quasijudicial functions.
Regardless of whether FERC maintains separate staffs for
internal administrative functions, the whole point is that
staff counsel of FERC has absolutely no authority to and has
never undertaken an appeal to the Court of Appeals or otherwise

6/
from a final order of FERC.-

While staff counsel of FERC will

often advocate a position before FERC and oppose before the
agency a decision or recommendation of an administrative law
judge, once FERC has decided the case by final order, the function of staff counsel as to that position is at an end.

There-

after, it is the responsibility of staff counsel for FERC to
support the agency adjudication on appeal.

For example, in

Public Service Commission of West Virginia v. Federal Power
Commission, 437 F.2d 1234 (4 Cir. 1971), the staff of the FPC
supported the agency final order, a case in which it, at the
administrative level, had proposed an opposite result.
Gas Co., 42 F.P.C. 305 (1969), reh.
1.

de~.

Mountain

43 F.P.C. 317 (1970).

Reliance on the Missouri Case is Misplaced.

The Division Brief in Opposition further relies upon State
ex rel Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Riley, 546 S.W. 2d 792
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977) for the proposition that staff and quasijudicial functions should be divided and that the staff has
standing to appeal its Commission's order.

In Missouri Power

A review of the decisions of the FPC or of FERC and of the opinions
lssued by Circuit Court of Appeals reflect no instance 1n which
staff counsel of FERC has attempted to appeal an order of the
agency.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
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& Light, the Missouri Legislature had specifically created a

separate agency to represent consumers, apart from the Missouri
Utilities Commission, because it was recognized by the Missouri
courts that the Commission staff and counsel could not challenge
Commission decisions by way of an appeal.
7944 5.

See 546 S.W. 2d at

Missouri Power & Light is authority for the position

of Mountain Fuel on Rehearing, not the Division of Public
Utilities.
2.

Reliance Upon an Appearance Before the Commission in a

Mountain Fuel Case is Fundamentally Misplaced.
The Division, at pages 16-17 of its Brief in Opposition,
points to a position taken by staff counsel for the Utah
Commission in P.S.C. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, P.S.C.
Docket No. 2906

(1947) as evidence that staff has, in the

past, taken positions of "vigorous advocacy".

The whole

trouble with the Division's argument in this regard, of course,
is that the "vigorous advocacy" of staff counsel was before
the Utah Commission, itself, and not before the Supreme Court
of Utah in an appeal from a Commission Order.

Mountain Fuel

has no quarrel with the proposition that Commission staff does
and should take contentious positions before the Commission
during the course of an administrative rate hearing.

But that

misses the point of this contest before this Court on Rehearing.
It is the standing to appeal an order of the Commission to this
Court, not the standing to appear before the P.S.C. that is
pivotal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The fact that the Division is required to rely upon a
proceeding before the Utah Commission vis-a-vis

thi~

Court in

a statutory appeal from a Commission Order to make its argument,
demonstrates the enormous fallacy of its position on Rehearing.
POINT V
THE DIVISION POSITION ON THE COMPOSITION
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THIS MATTER IS
SUPERFICIAL AND INVALID.
The Division argues simplistically that because Justice
Stewart was not disqualified before oral argument in the Case
but chose to disqualify himself after oral argument, there was
no constitutional defect in the Court composition.

Such is a

remarkable argument for the Attorney General of Utah to advance
in any case.

It is to say under such theory, that as long as

there are five Justices at the time of oral argument of a given
case, any Justice or two Justices may recuse himself or themselves thereafter without notice to the parties for whatever
reason the Justice may have; so long as there are three Justices
left to form a quorum, the Attorney General's argument is that
there is a validly constituted court to render a decision.
The rationale of the Division is not only specious, it
poses a clear and present danger to the judicial process.
Under such arrangement, a Justice could recuse himself sua
sponte after a matter has been submitted for

deter~ination

because of the difficulty or delicacy of the appeal and leave
the matter to the remaining Justices to the prejudice of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, -10administered by the Utah State Library.
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judicial system.

That is not at all to suggest that the

recusal of Justice Stewart in the Case at Bar was in any way
prompted by such motive.

But it is to say that the constitutional

mandate of Article VIII, Section 2 means what it plainly says -that the Supreme Court "shall consist of five Justices" for the
decision making process in the appellate review.

Under the

attendant facts, a quorum of the Court of sitting Justices
will not do.
Mountain Fuel, and to that end all the parties, were
denied the constitutional right to a full Court in the resolution
of this highly important case in public utility law.

The

Court was improperly constituted as a result of the postargument recusal of Justice Stewart without the consequent calling
of a district judge to sit in his place, and, ergo, the Court
could not constitutionally act.
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N
The Brief in Opposition of the Division does not attempt to
meet the Petition for Rehearing of Mountain Fuel or the Commission on the basis of the law or the facts in the record,
but rather upon the personal remarks and testimony of Division
counsel.

For reasons not apparent, Division counsel takes the

liberty to exposit his special facts and remarks as though they
were part of the record of this Case.

Regardless of the privi-

leged position which the Division believes it may have reached
before this Court, it has no license or favor to ignore the
traditional and established rules of appellate advocacy and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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review.

The time to stop that type of tactic is now.

The

Brief of the Division should be disregarded in preponderant
part.
The Division Brief does not squarely face the issues raised
by the Petition for Rehearing of Mountain Fuel.

It is respect-

fully submitted that the June 19, 1980 Opinion of this Court
should not and must not stand.
constituted.

The Court was improperly

The determination therein that adjustments in

rates in an abbreviated or summary proceeding must be supported
by "evidence concerning every significant element in the ratemaking components" is internally inconsistent, implausible,
and erroneous.

The judicial transfer of the investigatory and

prosecutorial functions of the Commission to the Executive
Director of Business Regulation is interpretive and substantive
error.

The Division, as the support staff of the Commission,

lacks standing to appeal an order of its own Commission.

This

Court should so conclude on Rehearing, it is respectfully
submitted.
The Petition for Rehearing of Mountain Fuel should be
granted, the matter reheard, and the main Opinion of June 19,
1980 should be revised, consistent with the principals at
large, to affirm the Order of the P.S.C.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of September, 1980.

R. G. GROUSSMAN
180 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84139
Attorneys for Mountain Fuel
Supply Company
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